It is often held that all sensory mental states ar states, and that sensory quality cannot occur in are not conscious. Indeed, it may seem mysterio could be for a state to have sensory quality if that a conscious state. Consciousness, on this view, is like a mental light, without which sensory qual cannot exist. When it comes to the qualities of states, to be is to be conscious, esse is percipi.
If sensory states are all conscious, it may seem the property of being conscious will be intrinsic tial, to having sensory quality; how better to ex sensory states are all conscious than by assumin ing conscious is intrinsic to having sensory quali picture, we can understand what it is for a stat sensory quality only if we know what it is for t be conscious. And, if states with sensory quality tially conscious states, understanding what it is states to be conscious will presumably require kn sensory quality is.
Seeing the properties of being conscious and sory quality as thus wedded makes for unnecessa What kind of property could it be that canno consciously? And what kind of property could of being conscious be if it is intrinsic to sen Indeed, it is arguable that all the traditional p sensory or phenomenal quality derive from th ing a conscious state is intrinsic to having se What seems difficult or intractable about sen the face it presents to consciousness -what th like for somebody who has it.
I shall argue that this picture is mistaken ties of being conscious and having sensory qu pendent of one another, and a satisfactory ac property requires us to investigate them sep tion 1, I argue that, since sensory states are n states, being a conscious state cannot be in state's having sensory quality. Section 2, then sketch of a account of what it is for a mental state to have sensory quality, an account on which having sensory quality does not imply being conscious. Moreover, as I show in section 3, this account helps explain, and thereby disarm, the intuitive force of the idea that being conscious is an intrinsic property of sensory states. In section 4 I conclude by arguing for a positive account of what it is for sensory states -and, indeed, for all mental states-to be conscious. On this account, a state's being conscious is its being accompanied by a roughly simultaneous higher-order thought that one is in the target mental state. So being conscious is an extrinsic property of those mental states which are conscious. If this account is correct, and if sensory states can occur without being conscious, we can conclude that the properties of being conscious and having sensory quality are independent of one another.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND SENSORY QUALITY
us."1 It is often assumed that this Cartesian doctrine reflects our commonsense concept of mind, for sensory states as well as for thoughts. That is not so; commonsense plainly does allow room for mental states that are not conscious states.
We sometimes see that somebody wants something or thin that something is so while that person is wholly unaware that desire or thought. Similarly with emotions; we occasi ally recognize that we are sad or angry only after somebo else points it out to us. It is natural to interpret sublimi perception and peripheral vision as showing that percept sensations can occur without our being aware of them.2 is arguable that even bodily sensations such as pains c at times go wholly unnoticed, and so can exist without b ing conscious. When one is intermittently distracted fro a headache or pain, it is natural to speak of having ha single, persistent pain or ache during the entire period. would be odd to say that one had had a sequence of brief distinct, but qualitatively identical pains or aches. Similar for itches and other bodily sensations.
Pragmatic factors explain much of the intuitive pull t wards thinking that sensory states are always conscio states. For one thing, our concern with the mental state of others is set in a social context that largely precludes marking on mental states of which they are unaware. 2We all typically screen out the sounds of conversations other tha our own. But, on the so-called cocktail-party effect, if one's name is mentioned in a screened-out conversation, one's attention often shift immediately to that conversation. It is natural to interpret this as show ing that one must have had some auditory consciousness of what was being said. than it is with others. And it turns out that the st intuition is with a particular kind of mental st interest we would have in nonconscious cases of of mental state. The idea that mental states must be conscious is strongest with bodily sensations such as pains tickles, less compelling with perceptual sensations, pres ably still less so with emotions, and very likely weakest intentional states such as thoughts and desires. Corresp ingly, we have the least interest in nonconscious bodily sations, whether our own or anybody else's, and far the in nonconscious beliefs and desires, because of their ro explaining behavior. This reinforces the diagnosis that think mental states must be conscious largely because o lack of interest in the nonconscious cases.
Still, these considerations may not seem sufficient to d arm completely the intuition that sensory states must be con scious. This is especially so in the case of bodily sensatio such as pain. For one thing, we speak roughly interchan ably of our feeling a pain or tickle or itch and of our hav the relevant sensation. And when we feel a pain or tickle itch, must not that sensation be automatically conscious Such terms as 'feeling' do carry this implication of con sciousness; a felt pain is perforce a conscious pain. Thi true as well of something's hurting, and perhaps even of one being in pain. But none of these things are the same as on simply having a pain, or a pain's existing. If we are interm tently unaware of a pain by being distracted from it, we f the pain only intermittently; similarly with its hurting our being in pain. Still, one may well speak of having ha a pain that lasted throughout the day. And if the questi arises in a natural way, one may even say explicitly that was not always aware of that pain. Common sense thus u deniably countenances the existence of nonconscious pains 3One could insist here that only a single, temporally discontinuo state of pain occurs, on the model of the temporally discontinuous bu of sound as a single siren sound. (I owe this idea to Jaegwon Kim.) all I am arguing here is that common sense be open to nonconsc pains; plainly common sense does not insist on the discontinuous-pa interpretation. Kripke's notorious denial of this for the case of mental states ("Iden tity and Necessity", 157-161; Naming and Necessity, 149-154) ste from his insistence that the way pains appear to us cannot diverge fro how they really are: "For a sensation to be felt as pain is for it to be pain ("Identity and Necessity", p. 163, n. 18; emphasis original throughou and, conversely, that "for [something] to exist without being felt as p is for it to exist without there being any pain" (Naming and Necessi p. 151). Thus "[i]f any phenomenon is picked out in exactly the same Sensory qualities, on anybody's account, are properties that distinguish sensory states, both from one another and from everything else. All and only sensory states have sensory quality, and the various types of sensory state differ in respect of their sensory qualities. So if sensory states occur that are not conscious, being conscious cannot be intrinsic to having sensory quality.
It is crucial to avoid a merely verbal issue. Some find it tempting to hold that the term 'sensory quality' can apply only to those qualities by reference to which we say what it is like to have one or another conscious sensation. If so, nonconscious states plainly cannot have sensory quality. Similarly, sensory states might be held to be definitionally conscious states.
These convictions in no way suggest, however, that nonc scious states do not exist corresponding to sensory state deed, it is natural to suppose that such nonconscious s do exist, since neural detection mechanisms must subs conscious sensation, whatever the nature of sensation be. Moreover, for neural states to subserve sensory stat must be possible to taxonomize these nonconscious stat that they resemble and differ from one another in way morphic to the similarities and differences among cons sensations. Call these nonconscious states s-states, and the properties of belonging to the equivalence classe fined by this taxonomy s-properties. What reason there be, then, other than arbitrary verbal fiat, to w hold the terms 'sensation' and 'sensory state' from non-conscious s-states? And what nonverbal reason could there be for refusing to apply the term 'sensory qualit nonconscious s-properties?
Common sense often sees the important properties of th as being intrinsic to them. This tendency is especially nounced when we know little or nothing about the na way that we pick out pain, then that phenomenon is pain" (N and Necessity, p. 153). But Kripke's contentions are correct only is necessary that pains affect us in the way they do, i.e., only if ing conscious is intrinsic to something's being a pain. Kripke giv independent argument for these claims. of those properties. Thus common sense finds co pre-Galilean view according to which bodies mo natural resting place, and having a particular nat place is an intrinsic property of each kind of body.
ing to see bodies as intrinsically tending toward downwards movement.7
Still, we get far more accurate and powerful expla bodily motions if we see a body's tendency to mo of its relations to other bodies. Similarly, it is pret appealing to see the property of being conscious to sensations. But as I shall argue in section 4, that we can explain what being a conscious state only if we regard being conscious as a relational 2 What Is Sensory Quality?
The foregoing considerations will, however, rema sive without at least the sketch of a suitable posi of what it is for mental states to have sensory must be possible, on such an account, for ment have sensory qualities whether or not those sta scious states. Sensory qualities will occur even w states are not conscious. But when states with se ities are conscious, there will be something it is those states, and sensory qualities will be the pr virtue of which that is so.
The distinctive qualities by means of which we classify sensations form families of properties that pertain to color, visual shape, sound, and so forth. The members of these families resemble and differ from one another in ways that parallel the similarities and differences among the corresponding perceptible properties of physical objects. For example, the red sensory quality of visual sensations resembles the orange 7Similarly, Michael McCloskey has elegantly and convincingly argued that ordinary commonsense predictions about bodily motions systematically err in ways that reveal the tacit false assumption that those motions are due to an internal force imparted by the source of motion. ("Intuitive Physics", Scientific American 248, 4 [April 1983]: 114-122.) sensory quality of such sensations more than either resembles the sensory green or blue of such sensations. This is so whatever else is true about such sensory qualities. A host of other relations characterize both physical color properties and the corresponding mental color properties. There is no reason to think that individual color properties of visual sensations resemble intrinsically the color properties of physical objects. Rather, it is the whole family of mental color properties that corresponds, by virtue of the relations that hold among its members, to the family of physical color properties. And it is in terms of these relations of resemblance and difference within the corresponding families that we understan the nature of both mental and physical colors.
Parallel remarks apply to the spatial properties that per tain to vision. Here it is plain that the spatial properties physical objects have nothing intrinsic in common with th corresponding properties of visual sensations. The propert of being physically round, for example, does not resemb the corresponding property of visual sensations. Still, be cause color cannot occur without shape, visual sensatio cannot have mental colors unless they have some propert that counts as the mental counterpart of physical shape.8 Just as with mental and physical color, mental roundnes and triangularity resemble and differ from each other in way homomorphic to the similarities and differences that hold between physical roundness and triangularity. Similar observ tions hold for other properties of shape9 and other sensor modalities.10 8And, since mental shape is plainly a different sort of property fro physical shape, the connection between color and shape shows that me tal color is a different sort of property from physical color.
9These mental analogues of physical spatial properties may well en able us to assign mental location to our visual impressions, in virtue o which they unite to form a single visual field.
10Various historical antecedents for these observations are availabl Berkeley held that at least some terms for sensible qualities fail to app to things univocally. Thus 'plane' and 'solid' apply primarily, on view, to the immediate objects of touch, and only derivatively to th objects of sight. Berkeley sometimes seems to claim that such terms are radically ambiguous, as when he writes that the visual and tactil Such parallels hold also in the case of bodil Consider pains. The distinctive qualities of bei bing, burning, or sharp resemble and differ in flect the similarities and differences among th ing physical objects and processes. Moreover, stabbing pains are both species of sharp pai cally result from piercing and stabbing objects Similarly, throbbing and pounding pains are s pains.11
It is important to emphasize that the parallels to which I am drawing attention involve the perceptible properties of physical objects, as these are conceived by commonsense. We must take care not to import into our commonsense notion of these physical properties aspects that have only to do with how those properties appear to us. But subject to that qualification, the present theory takes commonsense perceptible objects to which we apply these terms are "of a nature intirly different". But he also insists that planes and solids are both "equally suggested by the immediate objects of sight, [and] Press, 1969] , II, xvi) Thomas Reid claims that, when I smell a rose, "the sensation I feel, and the quality in the rose which I perceive, are both called by the same name...; so that this name has two meanings" (243). "All the names we have for smells, tastes, sounds, and for the various degrees of heat and cold, have a like ambiguity.... They signify both a sensation, and a quality [in physical objects] perceived by means of that sensation" (244). And in "A Reply to My Critics", G. E. Moore insists that all words for sensible qualities are "each used in two very different senses" to refer to perceptible properties of physical objects and to the qualities of sensory experiences (The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp [LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1942: 535-677, p. 657; see pp. 655-8) .
properties at face value. This is natural; the properties in terms of which we classify sensory states are themselves commonsense properties, and are part of our macroscopic way of cutting up reality.
Moreover, such reliance on commonsense properties is legitimate in the present context, since we can hope to reconstruct these commonsense properties tolerably well in terms of scientific properties and processes. Thus we can capture the commonsense colors of physical objects in terms of the spectral reflectance of those objects multiplied by the absorption spectra of the three light-sensitive elements in the daylight visual system. An object's looking green, for example, will consist in its reflecting a distribution of wavelengths that results in a specifiable ratio of activation among those three types of cones. So an object's being green would consist in its reflecting such a distribution of wavelengths under standard conditions -say, in cloudless, midday sunlight.12 We must still adjust for variations due to individual differences and conditions of solar illumination. But such idealizations are common in the scientific reconstruction of commonsense macroscopic categories.
Does this mean that we can simply dispense with our com monsense conception of physical color when it comes to co paring those properties with the mental properties of vis states? Those comparisons rely on similarities and differen in the two families of properties; mental color properties semble and differ from one another in ways homomorphic to the similarities and differences among physical color prop ties. Some of these parallels between the two families ca be expressed in terms of ratios, rather than physical col conceived in commonsense terms. For example, when a fi color is intuitively closer to a second than to a third, th corresponding ratio will very likely exhibit parallel relatio 12Because many different combinations of wavelengths can produ the same ratio, the specific reflective properties of objects that produ particular ratio in particular conditions of illumination may vary wid So objects that look the same in respect of color when illuminated daytime sunlight, e.g., may well seem to differ in color in other conditi of illumination.
But it may well be that important relations a bers of the commonsense color family cannot terms of how close one is to another. Perhaps a sc onomy of these properties will not sustain all the allels between those properties and the corresp qualities. If so, we may to this extent have to ret monsense conception of physical color. This is however, for the present account. We still can tify each such color that we can discriminate mat in terms of the relevant ratio of activation am cone types. So there will be a scientific recon legitimates the normal range of commonsense properties.
These observations form the basis of a sketch of what it is
to have sensory quality. Sensory qualities are properties o states of organisms, families of which bear certain systematic relations to families of properties of physical objects and processes to which the organism can respond. Moreover, the are properties of which we can be conscious, in the intuitively immediate way in which we are conscious of our own men states. Nothing in this account implies that sensory quali ties can occur only when the relevant sensory states are co scious states. Moreover, since consciousness does not figu in the account, being conscious is presumably not intrins to a state's having sensory quality.
The overall thesis I am defending is that the properties being conscious and having sensory quality are independe of each other. That thesis is independent of the particular count of sensory qualities I have just sketched. Any accoun will do on which sensory qualities are whatever propertie are distinctive of the various types of sensation, properti of which we can, but need not, be conscious in a suitab immediate way.
A question arises, however, about accounts that meet th condition. Can such an account do justice to the tradition notion of sensory quality, and the traditional problems a tendant on that notion? Or have we simply changed th subject, by substituting a watered-down, unproblematic n tion of sensory quality for the traditional concept, and th defined the problems away?
One way to approach this question is to ask whether such an account would square with the idea that the properties under consideration are genuinely qualitative. Being qualitative is not a very clear notion, but presumably a property's being qualitative means in part that the property is essentially the way consciousness reveals it to be. In any case, there is another example of a family of properties that common sense regards as qualitative, namely, the color properties of physical objects. Here, too, being qualitative expresses the idea that the properties in question are exactly as consciousness -in this case perceptual consciousness-reveals them to be.
Many have held that, whatever the appearances, we need not attribute genuinely qualitative colors to physical objects. We can, after all, relocate the apparent qualitative character of physical color inside, in the mind: We can say that the relevant properties of physical objects are not genuinely qualitative, but that they lead to visual sensations, whose distinctive properties are.
It is often pointed out that we cannot repeat this move; there is no place to relocate the qualitative character that the distinctive properties of sensory states seem to exhibit.
But that does not matter. We need not find some way to preserve the idea that color is qualitative. We are willing to deny qualitative color to physical objects because we accept that their qualitative character, however we interpret it, is merely apparent. It is a verdict of commonsense intuition on which we should not rely. We can say the same for the commonsense intuition that the distinctive properties of sensory states are qualitative. The inability to relocate the qualitative character of the mental properties of sensory states gives us no reason to insist that those mental properties really do have qualitative character. We need not preserve the "element of truth" in erroneous commonsense intuitions when we become convinced that these intuitions reflect only how things appear, rather than how they really are.
In any case, common sense tells us little if anything abou the sensory qualities of sensory states, except that they ar those properties in virtue of which we distinguish among those sensations, and that we can be more or less immedi-ately conscious of them. Our knowing about the in the first instance by way of the conscious ca show that they cannot occur nonconsciously, no is anything problematic about them. Commo not sustain the idea that sensory quality is prob Nor is there reason to hold that the similarities and differences on which that account relies cannot obtain except when the sensation in question is conscious. We can accurately and fully capture these similarities and differences on the basis of the relevant homomorphisms, independently of whether the sensory states in question are conscious. So we have no basis for denying that sensory qualities can occur nonconsciously. Nonconscious sensory states resemble and differ in just the ways that conscious sensory states do. They diverge only in that one group is conscious and the other not.
Why It Seems that Sensory Qualities Must Be Conscious
It may be difficult to dismiss the idea that sensory proper are qualitative unless we can explain the attraction that has for us. Being qualitative, as just noted, expresses the that a property is essentially the way consciousness re it to be. And that suggests in turn that sensory qua are invariably conscious. Why, after all, would consciou reveal the essence of sensory states if such states need n conscious?
Consciousness seems to reveal the essence of sensory qualities only because it is tempting to suppose that consciousnes is our only source of knowledge about the nature of those properties. Take color. It is often held that the term 'red' applies in the first instance to a mental property of visual sensations and derivatively, if at all, to a perceptible property of physical objects. 13 We understand what it is for a tomato t 13John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, iv, 16; Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957) , chapter 4; Frank Jackson, Perception: A be red solely by way of the tomato's having causal connections with red sensory states. Since our saying a tomato is red is then only a kind of shorthand for its having a certain tie to the mental red of sensory states, we cannot learn about that mental red from its connections to anything nonmental. We can learn about mental color only by distinctively mental means. The only available mental avenue to these properties is knowing what it is like to be in the relevant sensory states, and this depends on the relevant states' being conscious. This line of reasoning suggests that consciousness alone can reveal the nature of mental qualities, so that only conscious states can have these qualities.
The sketch of an account put forth in section 2 undermines this picture. On that account, the sensory qualities of sensations resemble and differ from one another in ways that parallel the similarities and differences that hold among the corresponding perceptible properties of physical objects.
So knowing what it is like to be in a sensory state is not the only way to understand the nature and character of sensory qualities. We can, instead, learn about them by way of their characteristic similarities and differences, which are homomorphic to those which hold among the corresponding perceptible properties of physical objects. In particular, we can in this way know such things as that mental red resembles mental orange more than either resembles mental green or blue. Similarly for qualities special to other perceptual modalities, and to bodily sensations.
The resulting understanding of mental qualities is not restricted to the relational properties of those qualities. The similarities and differences that hold among the qualities of a particular sensory modality help characterize that modality. And within each modality, the similarity and difference relations characteristic of each mental quality help fix what is distinctive of that quality. These relations thus help us grasp the nature of the various individual qualities. Knowing the relations that define the various mental color properties, for example, will help fix what it is for a sensory state to be In fact the opposite is the case. If being con an intrinsic property of sensory states, it is unl could get any informative explanation of what conscious consists in. No useful explanation wil unless we can represent the property of being having some articulated structure. But it wil justify the idea that being conscious is an intrin of conscious states if that property does have so tive structure. Once we assign some such struc property of being conscious, it will be at least to regard being conscious as an extrinsic proper states. So the only non-question-begging reason sciousness as an intrinsic property of mental sta that it lacks such structure, and is thus simple lyzable. And something's being simple effective our explaining it by appeal to anything else; sim ties are those we take to be primitive in our h explanation.14 14Franz Brentano's idea that a mental state's being con to its being in part about itself is a rare attempt to ass tive structure to being conscious, conceived of as an intr (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, tr. Antos C B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister [London: Routledge
CONSCIOUSNESS AND SENSORY QUALITY
In any case, an account is possible of what it is for a sensory state to be conscious on which being conscious and having sensory quality are independent properties. The account applies equally well to all mental states, whether intentional or sensory, but I shall concentrate here on the sensory case.
If a state is conscious, we are conscious of being in that state. The converse also holds, at least if we are conscious of being in the mental state in a suitably unmediated way. Ruling out reliance on inference and observation will capture that intuitive immediacy.15 So it is reasonable to hold that for a mental state to be conscious is for one to be conscious in a suitably immediate way of being in that state.
There are two ways we can be conscious of things: By perceiving them, and by having thoughts about them. The perceptual model of being conscious of something cannot help here. Perceiving involves characteristic sensory qualities. So on a perceptual model, a state's being conscious will involve some characteristic quality; otherwise the comparison with perception would be idle. Since sensory states need not be conscious, their sensory qualities are independent of their being conscious. So the characteristic quality that, on the perceptual model, being conscious introduces must be distinct from the sensory qualities that sensations already have. But then it is a mystery what those new qualities could be.16
The only alternative is that a mental state's being conscious consists in one's having a thought that one is in that very mental state, a thought based on neither observation nor inference. (Henceforth I omit this qualification.) On this theory, the relevant higher-order thought will not itself be a conscious thought unless we have a yet higher-order thought. This explains why we are generally unaware of such higher-order thoughts. It also allows a ready distinction be15We need not rule out inference and observation of which we are unaware. This exception is not circular, since I explain a mental state's being conscious by reference to an independent notion of being conscious of something.
16These concerns are reminiscent of Aristotle's question about whether or not the sense we use to see that we see is same as the sense of sight (de Anima III 2, 425bl3-4). Relatively weak conceptual resources will suffice for higher-order thought to refer to one's own sensory states
We refer in thought to physical objects by way of their position in our visual field. It is natural to suppose that thought can similarly refer to sensory states by way of their positio 17Being conscious of something may appear to be factive. Since per ceiving, unlike thinking, is arguably factive, perhaps the perceptual model is, after all, superior. But if the relevant consciousness really is factive, we can stipulate that our higher-order thoughts are as wel Moreover, there is reason to doubt that the way we actually are conscious of our conscious mental states guarantees truth; special views about privileged access notwithstanding, we can and do make mistake about what conscious states we are in.
18If I doubt or wonder whether some physical object is red, conscious of the object; similarly if I expect, hope, or desire that is. So perhaps if one doubts or wonders whether a mental state some particular property, or hopes, desires, or expects that it does, will thereby be conscious of the mental state. But it is not the do wonder, hope, or desire that makes us conscious of the object. If I d whether that object is red, or desire or suspect that it is, I must at think assertorically that the object is there. Similarly with doubt hoping or expecting that my mental state has some property; I m at least have the assertoric thought that I am in that state. Ha these nonassertoric attitudes will not make one conscious of being that state except by leading to one's have an affirmative thought one is in that state.
19A particular property may be described in both dispositional an nondispositional terms. Relative to the categories of folk psychology, need nondispositional states to make mental states conscious; but at subpersonal level we might describe those states in dispositional term I am grateful to Daniel Dennett for arguing the virtues of a dispositi treatment, and for much useful conversation on these topics in gene in the relevant sensory field. Something of this sort presumably explains how higher-order thoughts can be about sensory states even though conscious differentiation of sensory detail quickly outstrips our conceptual resources.
Elsewhere I have argued that a theory based on higher-order thoughts can save the phenomenological appearances at least as well as one can with the Cartesian idea that being conscious is intrinsic to mental states generally, and to sensory states in particular.20 In closing I shall indicate two ways this is so in the case of sensory states.
Some phenomenological data pertaining to sensory states are very likely harder to explain if we assume that being conscious is intrinsic to sensory states. There are sensory states that are conscious only some of the time, largely through shifts in attention, for example, pains from which we are temporarily distracted or auditory sensations that we screen out. The idea that being conscious is intrinsic to sensory quality in effect rules out such shifts between a state's being conscious and its not being conscious, presumably requiring some reinterpretation of the data; we might say, for example, that such sensations do not literally persist. But it is probable that such gerrymandering will make a satisfactory explanation harder to come by.21 Other data seem even less amenable to reinterpretation on which being conscious is an intrinsic property of conscious 21 Another example relies on a surprising fact about vision. Our visual field seems replete with visual detail throughout. This is because eye movements provide foveal vision over a wide area, and we retain the visual information thus gained. Nonetheless, at any given moment we are aware of little visual detail outside the center of our visual field. It is natural to speculate that our seeming to see much of this detail may in effect be due to our confabulating detailed visual sensations. Such confabulation would be far harder to understand if being conscious were intrinsic to sensory states.
states. We are often aware of more fine-grained among sensory qualities when we have more fine-gr ceptual distinctions at our disposal. Vivid exam from wine tasting and musical experience, where sophistication seems actually to generate experie more finely differentiated sensory qualities. The pr ory predicts this. The degree to which we are consci ferences among sensory qualities depends on how fin the concepts are that figure in our higher-orde The relevant sensory states may well have bee before one acquired the more fine-grained concep scious only in virtue of less subtle qualities. It i that we can explain these observations except by that appeals to higher-order thoughts.
On the present theory, consciousness is not on sential to mentality; it is an esoteric developmen capacities. Still, the intuition may persist that co is somehow central to the way we think about th we do justice to that intuition, if not by saving i explaining why we have it?
As noted earlier, one way that consciousness is our concept of mind is that we fix the extensions o for mental states, and indeed of the term 'me by way of the conscious cases of mental state sciousness figures in an even more important w it does not demarcate the distinctively mental, i that it provides the basis for our intuitive mar person. We are the only creatures we know of t gard as persons, but we can easily imagine discov that we would classify with ourselves in that wa of course, that only persons have conscious men many nonhuman animals presumably do, as is no reason to deny to animals without langu pacity to have suitable higher-order thoughts. Th higher-order thoughts do not require much richn ceptual resources or syntactic structure.22 22Moreover, as Daniel C. Dennett has noted, the beha linguistic animals sometimes indicates the presence of But we have no reason to suppose that animals other than persons are aware of whatever higher-order thoughts they may have. And if none of an animal's higher-order thoughts are conscious, it will lack the particular kind of reflective consciousness that involves some measure of rational connectedness in the way it is aware of its mental states. Be a person will, on this account, be a matter of degree, but th is as it should be. Our distant ancestors doubtless had the distinctive characteristics of people to some degree, tho not as fully as we do, and the same may well be true of oth creatures elsewhere.23 Though consciousness is not essen to mentality, it is very likely crucial in this way to our con of being a person.
The foregoing considerations suggest that a theory b on higher-order thoughts will very likely be able to sav thoughts. ("Conditions of Personhood", in The Identities of Perso ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universit California Press, 1976: 175-196, pp. 183-4 .) Dennett's cases involve animal's having a thought about another animal's thought, which turn is about some distinct thought of the first animal. Direct evi that an animal without language has a thought about another of it thoughts, however, may seem difficult to come by. For methodolo ideas about this kind of problem, see Lawrence Weiskrantz, "Some tributions of Neurophysiology of Vision and Memory to the Probl Consciousness", in Consciousness in Contemporary Science, ed. Marcel and E. Bisiach, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988: 183 pp. 194-197. 23It is worth comparing the present account of being a person to that put forth by Harry G. Frankfurt ("Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", The Journal of Philosophy LXVIII, 1 (January 14, 1971): 5-20. Frankfurt holds that what distinguishes persons is their ability to have higher-order desires that some particular one of their firstorder desires be effective in leading to action (6) (7) . He argues that forming such higher-order desires involves identifying oneself with one, rather than another, of one's first-order desires (13). Roughly, such identification is, he maintains, what is involved in the process of deciding (16), and being able to identify oneself with one's desires in this way is also what is distinctive of being a person (16). But forming decisions is not the only way one identifies oneself in mental terms. Being a person is, rather, the more general ability to be conscious of one's thoughts that one is in a particular mental state. Consciously thinking that one is in a particular mental state is consciously identifying oneself as that being which has that mental state.
phenomenological appearances pertaining to sens Moreover, on that account, a state's being co extrinsic property of that state. Our having go explain a mental state's being conscious by appe panying higher-order thoughts thus helps sust that a state's being conscious and its having sen are independent properties.24 
